Hello Everyone,
In yesterday’s class we learned about the latitude afforded to the judges when they weigh the facts brought before them as they arrive at a verdict. Specifically, we learned about the place afforded to circumstantial evidence and the place afforded to the judge’s instincts and impressions.
There is a famous story in the Gemarah about circumstantial evidence:
תלמוד ירושלמי (וילנא) מסכת סנהדרין פרק ד
אמר ר’ שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי רודף אחר אחד נכנס לחורבה נכנסתי אחריו ומצאתיו הרוג וזה יוצא וסייף מנטף דם אמרתי לו אראה בנחמה שזה הרגו אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי אלא היודע מחשבות יפרע מאותו האיש. לא הספיק לצאת משם עד שהכישו נחש ומת.
This exclusion of circumstantial evidence is not limited to capital crimes. There is a similar law in the Gemarah regarding claims for property damage:
תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא בתרא דף צג עמוד א
שור שהיה רועה ונמצא שור הרוג בצדו, אף על פי שזה מנוגח וזה מועד ליגח, זה מנושך וזה מועד לישוך – אין אומרים בידוע שזה נגחו וזה נשכו; רבי אחא אומר: גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצדו – בידוע שזה הרגו
In in Baba Batra there is a dispute between the חכמים and ר’ אחא about the admissibility of circumstantial evidence and the Halacha is like חכמים who proscribe it. It follows that cases can only be settled on the basis of witnesses’ testimony.
רמב”ם הלכות סנהדרין פרק כ
הלכה א
אין בית דין עונשין באומד הדעת אלא על פי עדים בראיה ברורה, אפילו ראוהו העדים רודף אחר חבירו והתרו בו והעלימו עיניהם או שנכנסו אחריו לחורבה ונכנסו אחריו ומצאוהו הרוג ומפרפר והסייף מנטף דם ביד ההורג הואיל ולא ראוהו בעת שהכהו אין בית דין הורגין בעדות זו ועל זה וכיוצא בו נאמר ונקי וצדיק אל תהרוג, וכן אם העידו עליו שנים שעבד ע”ז זה ראהו שעבד את החמה והתרה בו וזה ראהו שעבד את הלבנה והתרה בו אין מצטרפין, שנאמר ונקי וצדיק אל תהרוג הואיל ויש שם צד לנקותו ולהיותו צדיק אל תהרגוהו.
שולחן ערוך חושן משפט הלכות נזקי ממון סימן תח
סעיף ב
שור שהיה רועה, ונמצא שור הרוג בצדו, אף ע”פ שזה מנושך וזה מועד לנשך, זה מנוגח וזה מועד ליגח, אין אומרים בידוע שזה נגחו או נשכו. ואפילו גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא הרוג בצדו, אין אומרים בידוע שזה הרגו, עד שיראוהו עדים כשרים.
There are exceptions to this rule, and they are based on the concept of “דין מרומה”-the “fraudulent case.” The Halacha has rules of judicial procedure just like every other judicial system ( l’havdil).However the judge may not obey these rules blindly. If after hearing the witnesses and cross-examining both them and the litigants he may not issue a verdict based on the rules if his conscience is uncomfortable with the findings. The judge needs to listen critically to the witnesses and if he has a feeling that one of the sides to the suit is lying he must not ignore that feeling. The judge is not free to say, “I have done my duty and the lying side should bear the burden of the sin.”
How should the judge proceed when he suspects that either one (or both) of the litigants and/or the witnesses are lying? First the judge should question the parties over and over again in order to uncover the truth. If after extensive questioning the judge is still uncomfortable with the testimony he must recuse himself from the case and tell the litigants that they should seek a judge who feels that he is capable of issuing a verdict in their dispute. This is the opinion of the Rambam. The Shulchan Aruch adds the practice of the Rosh. When the Rosh was convinced that the plaintiff’s claim was fraudulent the Rosh would dismiss the case and give to the defendant a letter stating that no other court should hear the case. This would protect the defendant from future harassment by the plaintiff. When the defendant is lying the matter is more difficult to resolve. Merely dismissing the case benefits the defendant who lied to the court. On the other hand the court cannot find for the plaintiff when the rules of procedure point to a verdict in favor of the defendant. Therefore the Shulchan Aruch says that in such a case the judge needs to make every effort to prove the duplicity of the defendant. If the judge cannot prove that the defendant is lying and if the judge feels that the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly favors the plaintiff then he may find for the plaintiff. This extraordinary freedom to ignore the testimony of the witnesses in favor of the circumstantial evidence is only given to the judge who possesses great expertise and is the foremost scholar of his generation. As the Rema puts it:
שולחן ערוך חושן משפט הלכות דיינים סימן טו סעיף ד
כי אין לדיין באלו הדברים רק מה שעיניו רואות
We saw last week that the Gemarah heaps praise upon judges who rule correctly. The judge needs to follow both the rules of procedure and to look into the hearts of those who appear before the court. It is understandable that the renowned sage Rav Shimon bar Yochai said with relief that he is not qualified to judge according to דין תורה. The responsibility to arrive at the correct verdict is very great and the obstacles to discovering the truth are formidable.
We ended the shiur with a discussion about “lie detectors” and their admissibility in the courts. Rav Ovadiah Yosef zt”l heard a case in which a husband accused his wife of having had a romantic relationship with her employer. The wife admitted to having been alone with the employer but she said it was during work hours and she had never had the slightest idea of committing adultery. The husband was not persuaded by his wife’s denial and asked the court to instruct her to have a polygraph examination. The wife refused to have this test and the case was brought before Rav Ovadiah Yosef zt”l for a ruling.
Rav Ovadiah Yosef pointed out that “lie detectors” do not actually detect lies. These machines measure various bodily functions ( such as blood pressure and heart rate) which when elevated may be signs of stress. This being the case, the results of the test need to be interpreted by an “expert” who gives his impression to the court. This, according to Rav Ovadiah Yosef is certainly not “testimony” that a person has lied. It is at best circumstantial evidence ( known as אומדנא) and it is not even persuasive circumstantial evidence. This is because the device measures stress and the exam itself is stress-producing so the test is not really indicative of anything that the court could find informative or valuable.
Rav Ovadiah Yosef cited a case where a rabbi disallowed the testimony of two witnesses who failed a polygraph test. This rabbi felt that the results of the polygraph test were admissible as circumstantial evidence and therefore the case needed to be dismissed as a דין מרומה because the rabbi could not determine which side was telling the truth. Rav Ovadiah Yosef wrote that this rabbi erred in giving so much weight to the polygraph test. With regard to the case in question, Rav Ovadiah Yosef ruled that given the limitations of the polygraph test there is no basis for ordering the wife to undergo the test and the husband should make the effort to re-establish a peaceful relationship with his wife.
Thanks to everyone who attended the shiur. Stuart Fischman